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INTRODUCTION 
Recognizing that the Nation's economic, political, and social security 
require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reaffirms, as a 
matter of high priority, the Nation's goal of equal educational oppor-
tunity, and (2) declares it to be the policy of the United States of 
America that every citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or 
her full potential without financial barriers.1  
The above quote is the “national policy with respect to equal educational 
opportunity” Congress enacted in 1974 as part of the General Education 
Provisions Act.2 The highly aspirational statement suggests Congress 
wanted the states to take decisive and comprehensive action in educating 
the citizens of the United States. The statement further suggests the fed-
eral government was willing, if not entirely prepared, to provide the fi-
nancial backing for such an undertaking.  
  
 1. 20 U.S.C. § 1221-1 (2012). 
 2. Id. 
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However, this aspiration ended up being nothing more than that for 
many United States’ citizens with disabilities.3 Rather than seeking to 
meet the full potential of students with disabilities, individual states have 
largely provided students with disabilities an education that meets only 
the minimum legal requirements.4 Following Congress’s enactment of 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), the Supreme Court inter-
preted a key provision of this act, which requires states to provide a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE) to students with disabilities, to re-
quire nothing more than a showing that the student received some “edu-
cational benefits” from their public education.5  
In the decades since that decision, the circuit courts have split as to 
what standard they should use to evaluate whether a student has received 
a FAPE, with several circuits applying a higher standard which requires 
“meaningful educational benefits.”6 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit has 
faithfully applied the educational benefit standard the Supreme Court 
established and continued to do in its recent decision in Endrew F. ex rel. 
Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District Re-1.7 When the Tenth Cir-
cuit panel decided to adhere to precedent, it missed the opportunity to 
call for a new legal standard with which courts could evaluate the quality 
of the education students with disabilities receive.  
Fortunately, on September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court accepted 
certiorari, giving it the opportunity to establish a new legal standard. This 
Comment will explain  how the legal standard applied by the Tenth Cir-
cuit gives rise to serious problems,  necessitating the development of a 
new standard. Further, as this comment discusses, recent federal legisla-
tion concerning both special and general education policy demonstrates 
that the “some educational benefit” standard is no longer sufficient. Fi-
nally, this Comment will put forward a proposed new legal standard that 
more closely reflects Congress’s inspirational goal of educating all U.S. 
citizens to reach their full potential.  
  
 3. This comment will use the terminology “person with disability” rather than “disabled 
person” as this is the language preferred by persons with disabilities. Disability Etiquette: Tips on 
Interacting with People with Disabilities, UNITED SPINAL ASS’N., (last visited May 29, 2016). Simi-
larly, this term will replace the word “handicapped” in any quote. 
 4. See Robert Caperton Hannon, Returning to the True Goal of the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act: Self-Sufficiency, 50 VAND. L. REV. 715, 733 (1997). 
 5. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 206–07 (1982). 
 6. Scott Goldschmidt, A New Idea for Special-Education Law: Resolving the “Appropriate” 
Educational Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with Disabili-
ties, 60 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2011).  
 7. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Foundation 
In 1966, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act, appropriating funds dedicated to the provision of special edu-
cation services for the first time.8 Nearly a decade later, Congress found 
that out of the 8 million children with disabilities in the United States, 
more than half were not receiving an appropriate education that would 
provide them with “full equality of opportunity.” Moreover, Congress 
found the public school system had completely excluded 1 million of 
these children.9 Furthermore, many students in the public school system 
were failing academically because educators had not yet identified their 
disabilities.10 However, Congress found the states were otherwise able to 
provide effective education to students with disabilities, and had a re-
sponsibility to do so, but did not have the funds to accomplish the task.11 
Therefore, federally funded assistance to the states in meeting the needs 
of students with disabilities was of national interest, resulting in the 
EHA.12 
The stated purpose of the EHA was “to assure that all . . . children 
[with disabilities] have available to them . . . a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related services de-
signed to meet their unique needs . . . .”13 Under the EHA, states receiv-
ing federal assistance must provide a student with a disability with a 
FAPE regardless of the severity of the student’s disability.14 Additional-
ly, Congress required states to develop training to teach educators how to 
identify possible disabilities in students and to lay out what steps educa-
tors should take if they suspect a student has a disability.15 However, the 
FAPE requirement was the key provision of the EHA. Federal law de-
fines a FAPE as “special education and related services which (A) have 
been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agen-
cy, [and] (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in the State involved . . . .”16  
  
 8. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750, sec. F, § 601, 604, 608–
09, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204–08 (1966) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a)–(l), 881–85). 
 9. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3(a), § 601, 89 Stat. 773, 774 
(1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(b)). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 775. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1401(c)). 
 14. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 172–173 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 15. Andrea Valentino, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act: Chang-
ing What Constitutes an “Appropriate” Education, 20 J.L. & Health 139, 144 (2007). 
 16. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 4(a), § 602, 89 Stat. 773, 775 
(1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(18)). 
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Under the EHA, special education consists of “specially designed 
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs 
of a . . . child [with a disability], including classroom instruction, instruc-
tion in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals 
and institutions.”17 Instruction is “specially designed” by “adapting the 
content, methodology or delivery of instruction to meet a student’s 
needs.”18 Related services include “developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a . . . child [with a 
disability] to benefit from special education . . . .”19 
As the EHA defined these terms, schools were required to provide 
students with disabilities access to the same curriculum as their nondisa-
bled peers.20 Congress specified the means by which states would pro-
vide this access. Once a school has identified a student with a disability, 
the school would be required to develop an individualized education pro-
gram (IEP) to meet the unique needs of that student.21 The IEP is a writ-
ten statement that includes “present levels of educational performance,” 
annual goals, “the specific educational services to be provided . . . [,] the 
extent to which [the] child will be able to participate in regular educa-
tional programs,” and criteria and procedures for evaluating “whether 
instructional objectives are being achieved.”22 Although the EHA was 
the most comprehensive special education legislation of its time, it 
lacked details, leaving the Supreme Court with less information to inter-
pret how to evaluate whether the school has provided the student with a 
FAPE.23 
B. Rowley Standard 
The landmark case on the issue of how to determine whether a child 
has received a FAPE is Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central 
School District, Westchester County v. Rowley.24 In Rowley, the Supreme 
Court considered the situation of Amy, a deaf child whose teachers con-
sidered able to perform better than average academically, despite the fact 
that her disability prevented her from understanding everything happen-
ing in the classroom. 25 The Court overturned the decision of the lower 
court, which defined a FAPE as “an opportunity [for students with disa-
  
 17. Id. (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(16)). 
 18. Mitchell L. Yell et al., Individualized Education Programs and Special Education Pro-
gramming for Students with Disabilities in Urban Schools, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 669, 689 (2013). 
 19. Education of the Handicapped Act § 602 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(17)). 
 20. Amy J. Goetz et al., The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth Circuit: Pro-
tecting the Right to a Free and Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Standards-Based 
IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L.R. 503, 508 (2011). 
 21. Education of the Handicapped Act § 602 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(18)). 
 22. Id. (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1402(19)). 
 23. See Hannon, supra note 4, at 726. 
 24. See Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 505. 
 25. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 185 (1982). 
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bilities] to achieve [their] full potential commensurate with the oppor-
tunity provided to other children.”26 The Court held that in enacting the 
EHA, Congress did not intend to guarantee students with disabilities 
either any particular level of education or opportunity equal to that of 
nondisabled students.27 Instead, the Court concluded, Congress sought to 
provide a “basic floor of opportunity” to students with disabilities.28 The 
Court provided lower courts with a two-part test to determine whether a 
student has been provided with a FAPE: 1) did the state comply with 
EHA procedural requirements and 2) was the resulting IEP “reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?”29 The 
result of this test was a standard that equated some educational benefit to 
an appropriate education.30 
In concluding Congress sought only to establish a floor of educa-
tional opportunity for students with disabilities, the Court strictly inter-
preted the definition of FAPE in the EHA.31 In defining a FAPE, Con-
gress used the words “to benefit,” rather than including language modify-
ing the word “benefit.” Therefore, the Court reasoned Congress must 
have meant that any educational benefit would be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the EHA.32  
The Court additionally relied on other language in the statute, which 
required states to prioritize extending educational services to children 
with disabilities who were not receiving any education over those whose 
education was merely inadequate.33 This priority, combined with the 
FAPE definition, showed the Court that Congress’s intent was only to 
provide students with disabilities access to public education, nothing 
more.34 Thus, the Court rejected the idea that Congress went so far as to 
require schools to maximize the potential of students with disabilities.35 
To date, the Court has chosen not to revisit the some educational 
benefit standard it established in Rowley. It has made this choice in spite 
of the fact that the circuits have split as to how courts should evaluate the 
sufficiency of an IEP.36 
  
 26. Id. at 186. 
 27. Id. at 192, 198, 200. 
 28. Id. at 201. 
 29. Id. at 206–07. 
 30. See Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 751. 
 31. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188–89. 
 32. Id. at 189. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 199. 
 36. See Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 762; Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A 
Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 ED. L. REP. 1, 6 (2009). 
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C. Circuit Split 
Confusing language in Rowley has led to a split among the circuits 
as to what standard courts should apply to evaluate IEPs.37 In asserting 
that Congress’s goal was primarily to give students with disabilities ac-
cess to public education, the Court made this statement: “But in seeking 
to [make public education available to children with disabilities], Con-
gress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational 
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”38  
The Third Circuit used this precise language to justify adoption of 
an arguably higher standard than the one established in Rowley.39 A 
number of other circuits have adopted this standard, commonly known as 
the “meaningful benefit” standard. However, the Supreme Court’s lan-
guage in Rowley is so confusing and imprecise that the circuit courts 
have struggled to articulate precisely which standard they are applying. 
As a result, scholars commenting on the split differ as to the number of 
circuits that adhere to one standard or the other.40  
Despite the disagreement as to which standard a given circuit ap-
plies, scholars generally agree the Third Circuit has consistently applied 
a higher standard than the one announced in Rowley.41 The Third Circuit 
initially developed the meaningful benefit standard in Polk v. Central 
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16,42 where it required schools to con-
sider a student’s potential when developing an IEP.43 Although the Third 
Circuit requires consideration of potential, it is important to note it does 
not require schools to maximize potential.44 Further, although commenta-
tors often consider this a single standard, the Third Circuit has explicitly 
rejected the idea that what constitutes an appropriate education for stu-
dents with such diverse needs “could be reduced to a single standard.”45 
However, the Third Circuit did set something of a universal standard by 
  
 37. Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 751; Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the 
Circuit Courts Denied a Free Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 
1, 6 (2005). 
 38. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. 
 39. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 179–80 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 40. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1339 n.8 
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016); compare Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 758–59 
(asserting that six circuit courts have adopted the heightened standard, while five use the Rowley 
standard, with the last circuit applying a mixed standard), and Aron, supra note 37, at 7 (tallying up 
a total of six federal appeals courts that apply the “meaningful benefit” standard), with Wenkart, 
supra note 36, at 1 (stating that seven circuit courts have applied the “some educational benefit” 
standard), and Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J.L. & 
EDUC. 25, 27 (2012) (stating that the majority of the circuit courts apply the “some educational 
benefit” standard). 
 41. E.g., Wenkart, supra note 36, at 2; Goldschmidt, supra note 6, at 760; Aron, supra note 
37, at 7; Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 513. 
 42. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988).  
 43. Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 513.  
 44. Wenkart, supra note 36, at 3 (“. . . all courts have held that a school district is not required 
to maximize each child’s potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.”). 
 45. Goetz et al., supra note 20, at 514. 
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establishing in Polk that, for a student’s specialized education to consti-
tute a FAPE, there must be evidence of more than a mere trivial or de 
minimus benefit to the student.46 
D. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
In the late 1990s, Congress recognized it had set low expectations 
for students with disabilities in enacting the EHA. 47 Thus, it significantly 
amended the EHA, and renamed the law the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).48 These amendments added detailed procedures 
for schools to follow during IEP development, providing some guidance 
as to what courts could consider an “appropriate” education.49  
A second round of significant amendments came in 2004.50 These 
amendments specified three major components required for all IEPs.51 
First, the IEP must include a statement of current academic achievement 
and functional performance levels.52 This statement is the “starting point 
from which [IEP] teams develop the IEP and measure its success.”53 The 
statement must specifically include how the student’s disability affects 
access to the general education curriculum, which allows the IEP team to 
develop appropriate goals, interventions, and objectives to allow the stu-
dent with a disability to be educated with his or her peers as much as 
possible.54  
Second, schools must include in the IEP annual goals capable of 
measurement as well as how the school will measure progress towards 
those goals.55 Schools base these goals on the statement of current aca-
demic achievement and functional performance levels with the objective 
of mediating the academic or functional deficits the student’s disability 
causes.56 This mediation should allow the student to participate and grow 
under the general education curriculum.57 The measurable character of 
the standards is important because without measurable standards, IEP 
team would not be able to determine if the current accommodations and 
interventions were effective for the student’s educational goals or if they 
needed modification.58  
  
 46. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 47. Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Enough Is No Longer Good 
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley Defi-
nition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 14 (2012). 
 48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2012). 
 49. Valentino, supra note 15, at 144. 
 50. Id. at 155. 
 51. Yell et al., supra note 18, at 686. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 687. 
 55. Id. at 686. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 687. 
 58. Id. at 687–88. 
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Lastly, all IEPs must include a statement of the special education, 
related, or supplementary services the student will receive.59 When de-
veloping this statement, schools must consider the actual needs of the 
child rather than whether those services are currently available.60 Further, 
the amount of time spent in the general education setting versus time 
spent outside of that setting must be included, as well as an explanation 
of where the student will be when not included in the general education 
classroom.61 This delineation of time forces the IEP team to consider 
whether more or less time with nondisabled peers is appropriate based on 
that student’s needs.62 
For students whose disabilities create behavior issues that inhibit 
that student’s or other students’ ability to learn, the IEP must additionally 
include a behavioral intervention plan (BIP).63 The term intervention is 
key, as the plan is required to create and implement positive strategies 
for managing or correcting the problematic behaviors rather than punish-
ing the student.64 In Endrew, one of the petitioner’s main arguments was 
the school’s failure to address Endrew’s behavior issues to such an extent 
it had failed to provide him with a FAPE. 
II. ENDREW F. EX REL. JOSEPH F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. 
RE-1 
A. Facts 
At the age of two, Endrew F. (Drew) was diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD).65 As a further complication, doctors diagnosed 
Drew with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder a year later.66 ASD is a 
developmental disability affecting several major areas of an autistic per-
son’s life, including social interaction, cognitive functioning, verbal and 
nonverbal communication abilities, and general educational perfor-
mance.67  
Unlike other developmental disorders, ASD is a spectrum, wherein 
those diagnosed with it can exhibit a range of numerous symptoms 
common to the disorder but no one symptom need always be present.68 
  
 59. Id. at 686. 
 60. Id. at 690. 
 61. Id. at 691. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 692. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (“Endrew”), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, No. 12-CV-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at 
*1, *1 (D. Colo. Sep. 15, 2014) (“Endrew F.”); Endrew at 1333. 
 68. Elizabeth Hervey Osborn, Comment, What Happened to “Paul’s Law”?: Insights on 
Advocating for Better Training and Better Outcomes in Encounters Between Law Enforcement and 
Persons with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 333, 339–40 (2008). 
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Drew specifically has difficulty communicating his personal needs and 
emotions, and he is unable to engage in normal social interactions with 
others.69 Although all of Drew’s symptoms make daily life a struggle for 
him, several symptoms interfere with his ability to learn and participate 
in a traditional school setting.70 Specifically, Drew exhibits maladaptive 
behaviors including fleeing the classroom and school building, dropping 
his body to the ground, climbing on things, vocalizing very loudly with 
perseverative language, and picking or scraping at his skin.71 Additional-
ly, Drew fears dogs, flies, and using a new or public restroom so severely 
it significantly inhibits his ability to function at school.72 
Drew’s parents, Joseph and Jennifer, initially placed Drew into the 
Douglas County School District (Douglas County), which he attended 
until May of 2010, his fourth grade year of school.73 Although Douglas 
County developed an IEP designed to meet Drew’s particular educational 
needs, Drew’s parents felt he was not meaningfully progressing in his 
education or development of functional skills.74 Drew’s parents further 
felt Douglas County had failed to address adequately Drew’s increasing-
ly serious disruptive behaviors.75 These behaviors, in addition to those 
stated above, included urinating and defecating on the floor of the 
school’s “calming room”; hitting or kicking computers, TV screens, and 
walls; kicking others; and banging his head against walls.76 Although 
previous IEPs contained a BIP, the plans only addressed one or two of 
Drew’s disruptive behaviors and were never based on functional behav-
ioral assessments (FBAs).77 Consequently, Joseph and Jennifer removed 
Drew from his public elementary school, rejected the IEP Douglas Coun-
ty developed, and enrolled him at Firefly Autism House, which special-
izes in educating autistic children.78 
After enrolling Drew at Firefly, his parents sought reimbursement 
from Douglas County, arguing that because the public school had failed 
to provide Drew with a FAPE it was required under the IDEA to provide 
reimbursement for the private school tuition as well as reasonable trans-
portation costs.79 After Douglas County refused, Drew’s parents went to 
  
 69. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *1. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341 
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016). 
 75. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *2. 
 76. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *2. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at *1; Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333. 
 79. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1333. 
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the Colorado Department of Education and filed a due process com-
plaint.80 
B. Procedural Facts 
Over the course of three days in June 2012, an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) with the Colorado Office of Administrative Courts conduct-
ed the due process hearing.81 The ALJ concluded that, although the IEP 
had minimal progress monitoring and lacked support for conclusory 
statements about Drew’s progress, those deficiencies did not amount to 
denial of a FAPE.82 The ALJ also rejected the parents’ contention that 
Douglas County’s failure to conduct FBAs or implement a BIP designed 
to address Drew’s increasingly disruptive behaviors resulted in denial of 
a FAPE.83 Thus, the ALJ found for Douglas County and denied the reim-
bursement claim. 84 
The parents filed for review of the ALJ decision in the U.S. District 
Court of Colorado, which, in affirming the ALJ decision, reasoned that 
Drew’s IEPs did reveal minimal progress in his education and functional 
skills.85 Specifically, the district court noted that even though Douglas 
County carried over the objectives listed on Drew’s IEP each year be-
cause they had not been met, it was “clear that the expectation in the 
objectives are increased over time.”86 Regarding the behavioral issues, 
the district court reasoned the school had addressed the problems and a 
new BIP was in progress when Drew’s parents withdrew him from 
Douglas County.87 Thus, Douglas County had met the minimum re-
quirements of the IDEA.88 After the district court’s affirmation of the 
ALJ decision, Drew’s parents appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which accepted the case for panel review.89 
C. Panel Opinion 
Judges Hartz, Tymkovich, and Phillips heard the case, with Judge 
Tymkovich authoring the unanimous opinion.90 The appellate panel of 
the court affirmed the district court decision, finding Douglas County did 
not violate the IDEA and was therefore not required to reimburse Drew’s 
parents for the cost of the private school tuition.91  
  
 80. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th 
Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 29 (2016); Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *9. 
 86. Endrew F., 2014 WL 4548439, at *9. 
 87. Id. at *12. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Endrew, 798 F.3d at 1332. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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To begin, the court outlined its analysis and noted it could order 
Douglas County to reimburse Drew’s parents only if it found both that 
Douglas County had denied Drew a FAPE and that the IDEA authorized 
Drew’s placement at Firefly.92 To determine whether Douglas County 
provided Drew with a FAPE, the court explained it must analyze two 
issues, whether IDEA’s procedural requirements had been complied with 
and whether the IEP resulting from those procedures was “‘substantively 
adequate’ such that it [was] ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive educational benefits.’”93  
The court considered both the parents’ procedural and substantive 
challenges.94 Drew’s parents specifically argued that the IEPs Douglas 
County developed were procedurally deficient in two ways.95 The first 
procedural challenge contended that Douglas County had deprived the 
parents of the opportunity to participate in Drew’s education by failing to 
provide adequate progress monitoring to them.96 In their second proce-
dural challenge, Drew’s parents offered two alternative positions.97 First, 
they asserted that Douglas County’s failure to conduct FBAs of Drew, 
despite the severity of his behavioral issues, resulted in the denial of a 
FAPE.98 Alternatively, regardless of the failure to conduct FBAs, Drew’s 
parents argued that Drew did not receive a FAPE because the school 
never implemented an appropriate BIP that would adequately address his 
serious behavior issues.99 
As to the first procedural challenge, the court found that the gaps in 
progress monitoring on Drew’s IEPs did not prevent the parents from 
participating in his education. In so finding, the court reasoned the evi-
dence regarding frequent informal monitoring and communication be-
tween Drew’s special education teacher and his parents showed adequate 
parental participation in Drew’s education.100 Furthermore, the court not-
ed the parents reviewed Drew’s IEPs each year prior to implementation, 
and made suggestions as to what they felt would be appropriate for their 
son.101 In rejecting the parents’ argument that Drew’s case was factually 
similar to a case out of an Alabama federal district court, the court stated 
the critical difference was that in that case, the administrative hearing 
officer had found that the reporting deficiencies clearly caused adverse 
impacts to the child’s education.102 Because the ALJ in Drew’s case con-
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 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1335. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 1336. 
12 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
cluded there were no such adverse impacts on Drew’s education, the 
limited formal progress monitoring did not deny his parents an oppor-
tunity to participate in his education.103 
The court next addressed the procedural challenge based on Drew’s 
continuing and increasingly serious maladaptive behaviors.104 Here the 
court relied directly on statutory interpretation, reasoning that this chal-
lenge could not truly be applied to Drew’s situation, as the statute only 
requires implementation of a BIP if the student’s school placement has 
changed as a result of a disciplinary decision; Drew had experienced no 
such change.105 Absent any disciplinary change, the school must only 
consider behavioral intervention, which Douglas County clearly did dur-
ing Drew’s fourth grade year.106 In particular, the court mentioned the 
steps Drew’s special education teacher took, including logging anecdotal 
data of behavior incidents to determine Drew’s triggers and requesting 
that a behavior specialist meet with the IEP team to develop a new be-
havior plan.107 Thus, the court found for Douglas County on both proce-
dural challenges.108 
As with the procedural challenges, Drew’s parents made two sub-
stantive arguments, the second of which has two subparts.109 The first 
argument, which the court spent the most time addressing, asserted that 
Tenth Circuit precedent called for application of the meaningful benefit 
standard when evaluating whether Drew’s IEP was sufficient to meet 
IDEA requirements.110 As to the second substantive argument, Drew’s 
parents contended the IEPs were inadequate on the one hand because 
they were not reasonably calculated to provide Drew with educational 
benefit since Drew continually failed to meet his stated goals.111 On the 
other hand, the parents argued the school neglected to consider the sig-
nificance of the impact Drew’s behaviors had on his education when 
developing the IEP the school believed was reasonably calculated to pro-
vide an educational benefit.112 
As to the substantive challenges, the court first discussed the proper 
standard for courts to use when determining whether an IEP met the re-
quirements of the IDEA and then addressed whether Drew’s IEP actually 
met that standard.113 As to what standard the IDEA does require, the 
court discussed the history of the case law interpreting the IDEA and its 
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predecessor. the EHA,114 much of which has been discussed above. The 
court first addressed the circuit split wherein some circuits apply the 
meaningful benefit standard.115 However, the court offered no substan-
tive reasons for declining to apply the heightened standard, other than 
stating in a footnote that “how much more benefit a student must receive 
for it to be meaningful” is unclear.116 Instead, the court relied on the idea 
that, being only a panel of the Tenth Circuit rather than the court sitting 
en banc, Tenth Circuit precedent bound the panel to adhere to the some 
educational benefit standard.117 Thus, the panel faithfully applied the 
Rowley standard, allowing it to find no substantive violations of the 
IDEA and to conclude that Douglas County had provided Drew with a 
FAPE.118 
In considering whether Drew’s IEP was sufficient, the court deter-
mined whether the evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that the IEP 
was reasonably calculated to provide Drew with some educational bene-
fit.119 Specifically, the court looked at Drew’s past progress and found 
that, despite the ALJ’s finding that the IEPs had little to no progress 
monitoring or measurement data, the record supported the ALJ’s conclu-
sion that Drew had made some academic progress.120 The court stated 
that, despite the parents’ contention that Drew’s fifth grade IEP was 
functionally the same as his previous IEPs, the “objectives and measur-
ing criteria listed under the annual goals . . . typically increased with dif-
ficulty from year to year.”121 Additionally, the court noted that both 
Drew’s mother and special education teacher testified that Drew made at 
least some progress while enrolled in Douglas County.122  
As to whether Douglas County’s handling of Drew’s behavioral 
problems caused Drew’s IEP to be substantively inadequate, the court 
found the county’s efforts, discussed above, in consulting with a behav-
ioral specialist sufficient to show that Douglas County had adequately 
addressed Drew’s behavioral problems.123 Furthermore, the court found it 
important that, despite the severity of the behavioral problems, Drew was 
still able to make some progress in his education.124 Thus, the court 
found sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s presumptively correct 
decision, commenting that the IDEA does not require schools to maxim-
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ize student achievement or to ensure students reach any particular level 
of knowledge at all beyond some progress.125  
III. ANALYSIS 
The circuit courts have split as to how they should evaluate whether 
an IEP is sufficient to provide a student with a disability with a FAPE. 
This has resulted in dramatically different educational services for stu-
dents with disabilities depending upon which circuit they live in.126 If 
Drew lived in a state within the Third Circuit, it is likely the Douglas 
County IEP would have been found to violate the IDEA. This discrepan-
cy in outcomes makes it clear; the Court must reconsider the standard 
established in Rowley. However, this Comment will argue that, although 
the some educational benefit standard is certainly inadequate, the mean-
ingful education benefit standard the Third Circuit developed is similarly 
insufficient to meet the needs of students with disabilities and honor 
Congressional intent. Thus, the courts must develop a new standard, one 
based upon concrete measurements. 
A. The Source of the Problem 
The discrepancy in required educational standards comes from the 
less than clear language in Rowley discussed above. However, even if 
every circuit applied the some educational benefit standard, a significant 
problem would still exist. Specifically, the Rowley standard sets the bar 
too low, essentially raising the requirement schools must meet only 
slightly above a trivial educational benefit.127 In almost every other legal 
context, the legal system requires courts to consider what is best for a 
child, or at the very least, what situation is better for that child.128 How-
ever, when a child’s special education needs are at issue, Rowley creates 
a potentially adversarial situation where parents want the best for their 
child but the school does not have to reach that high. In other words, 
schools can provide minimal services to students as long as the child 
receives something more than a trivial educational benefit.129 There is a 
further adversarial element to this situation. Special education providers 
do not have total control over what services they provide to the student, 
and school administrators often find it hard to justify the costs of addi-
tional services when they are not legally required.130 Thus, special educa-
tion providers may be caught in the middle, with the desire to advocate 
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for the student along with the parents but lacking the authorization from 
the school district to do so.131 
In addition to creating tension between parents, special education 
providers, and school administrators, the Rowley standard results in 
courts taking a minimalistic approach to these cases. This approach fo-
cuses on whether the student has passing grades or advances to the next 
grade level each year.132 Although these goals are undoubtedly important 
in the general education context, they can be less indicative of true aca-
demic or functional progress for some students with disabilities.133 For 
example, many elementary schools no longer assess students with tradi-
tional grades.134 Additionally, even when traditional grades are used, 
accommodations provided to the student result in grades higher than 
those commensurate with the student’s skill level.135 The consequence is 
a skewed picture of the educational benefit, which appears to be signifi-
cant but in fact may only be trivial.  
One commenter has suggested a solution to this problem in concert 
with raising the substantive standard.136 Courts would consider grades as 
to the question of progress measurement on a sliding scale that gives 
more or less weight to the grades only if the student spends most of his 
or her school time in the general education classroom.137 The weight of 
the grades would be based on whether the graded courses use the same 
curriculum as nondisabled students, whether that student’s assignments 
are the same as nondisabled students, and whether the student with a 
disability completed the work with accommodations that do not require 
the student to complete the same academic tasks as nondisabled stu-
dents.138 The commenter argues this solution is in line with the meaning-
ful benefit standard, which requires courts to look beyond grades and 
annual advancement to determine if a school has provided the student 
with a FAPE.139  
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Nevertheless, only addressing one aspect of the problem the Rowley 
standard has created does not go far enough. This is particularly true 
when, as the United States District Court of Colorado stated, “ . . . an IEP 
may have been reasonably calculated to achieve some benefit, yet fail to 
do so in the end.”140 This statement is no less true when the standard is 
elevated to meaningful. Furthermore, in asserting this as a defense of the 
some educational benefit standard, the court did not address whether a 
student would be provided with a FAPE when a court found the IEP to 
be reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits yet failed to 
accomplish that for several years. The result of this situation could be a 
student reaching secondary education levels without having achieved 
many of the skills required to be successful in that setting. 
B. Congressional Intent Has Expanded Beyond Simply Providing Access 
In setting the standard for courts to evaluate IEPs, the Rowley court 
relied heavily on the EHA’s provisions and legislative history to glean 
from them that Congress only intended to provide students with disabili-
ties access to public education and not any substantive level of educa-
tional benefit.141 In the time since Rowley, Congress has substantially 
amended the EHA, suggesting its intent has shifted to something more 
than simply providing students with disabilities access to public educa-
tion.142  
To address the problem of insufficient education for students with 
disabilities, the first step was providing access. Thus, the EHA focused 
on that first step, driving the Court’s interpretation in Rowley.143 Howev-
er, Congress was motivated to amend the EHA because it recognized and 
explicitly stated in the IDEA that the expectations it had set in the EHA 
were low, impeding the original idea behind the law.144 This suggests 
Congressional intent has shifted such that the goal is to assess the “actual 
academic performance” of students with disabilities by demanding sub-
stantive guidelines for IEP evaluation.145 Further, a clear overarching 
purpose of the IDEA is to provide students with disabilities with an edu-
cation that would make college a reachable goal for as many students 
with disabilities as possible.146 If the reasoning behind the Rowley stand-
ard was the intent of the EHA was only to provide access and if the 
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IDEA amendments show this intent has substantially changed, courts 
need to alter the standard they apply to these cases.147 
Several provisions of the IDEA support the argument that it is time 
for a new standard based on concrete, measurable criteria. Congress even 
amended the stated purpose of the IDEA to focus on “educational results 
for children with disabilities.”148 Specifically, all services provided to a 
student with a disability must be supported by peer-reviewed research, 
which is necessarily results-based.149 Instead of schools determining uni-
laterally what services they find acceptable, they must be able to show 
that other people, using the school’s desired method, have achieved sub-
stantive positive results.150 This requirement goes beyond simply provid-
ing students with disabilities a basic opportunity for education.151  
An additional provision that supports implementation of a new 
standard includes the new requirement to administer the standardized 
tests that nondisabled students take to students with disabilities.152 This 
focus on results is not only on student performance while in the public 
education system, but after graduation as well. One amendment created a 
new requirement for high schools, which must add post-secondary transi-
tion goals to IEPs once the student reaches the age of sixteen.153 
The fact that schools are required to consider post-secondary goals 
and functional life skills indicates Congress has shifted its intention away 
from simple access to education and toward some level of self-
sufficiency and independent living.154 To be in line with that intent, 
schools must provide more than just some educational benefit, and courts 
must change the standard they use to evaluate whether a school has pro-
vided a student with a FAPE.155 As the Sixth Circuit stated in Deal v. 
Hamilton County Board of Education, “states providing no more than 
some educational benefit could not possibly hope to attain the lofty goals 
proclaimed by Congress [in the IDEA].”156 
Finally, the enactment of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) suggests 
courts should revisit Rowley.157 The stated purpose of NCLB is “to en-
sure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to 
obtain a high-quality education . . . .”158 This groundbreaking act imple-
mented massive reforms for federal education funding that focused on 
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demanding standards-based assessments.159 Under NCLB, states must 
develop grade level standards, which schools use to administer the as-
sessments and develop curricula.160 These standards tell administrators 
and teachers “what students should know and be able to do at various 
points and grade levels.”161 While Rowley “eschews student outcomes” 
and considers only what an IEP is reasonably calculated to provide, 
NCLB focuses primarily on student results.162  
Under NCLB, standards-based assessment scores of most students 
with disabilities must be included with the data in mandated progress 
reports.163 This makes the goals behind NCLB informative as to how 
courts should approach developing a new standard for evaluating wheth-
er a school has provided a student with a FAPE. In fact, Congress enact-
ed the most recent IDEA amendments with the goal of aligning special 
education law with the requirements of NCLB.164 This is further evi-
dence that Congressional goals regarding special education have changed 
significantly since Rowley was decided, necessitating a new legal stand-
ard. 
In December 2015, Congress made significant changes to NCLB, 
renaming it the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).165 Despite these 
changes, which include reducing federal control over state standards, 
most students with disabilities are still required to take the standards-
based assessments as often as nondisabled children are.166 Thus, while 
the ESSA may change what is required of the general education curricu-
lum, it does not change the fact that Congress amended the IDEA specif-
ically to bring special education law into line with that of general educa-
tion law. 
C. Alternative Standards 
Although it is clear that a new legal standard is necessary, what that 
standard should be is less clear. Several circuit courts, following the lead 
of the Third Circuit, have concluded that the meaningful benefit standard 
adequately ensures schools will provide students with disabilities a 
FAPE.167 However, “meaningful” is a term without definite boundaries. 
Two different courts could look at the same IEP, examine the services 
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provided to the student, and differ as to whether the school has provided 
the student with meaningful benefits. Even the Tenth Circuit has indicat-
ed it finds it difficult to distinguish what more the meaningful benefit 
standard requires of schools beyond the Rowley standard.168 The struggle 
to find precisely where educational benefits reach the point of being 
meaningful suggests the meaningful benefit standard will eventually 
prove to be unworkable. Little exists in the way of jurisprudence that 
would definitively affirm there is a substantive difference between the 
Rowley standard and the meaningful benefits standard.169 
The new legal standard could find a basis in NCLB. Using the 
standards-based assessments to evaluate whether a school has provided a 
student with a FAPE would have a number of benefits. First, national 
education policy would focus on student outcomes and satisfy Congres-
sional intent170 Second, the results of the standards-based tests would 
provide courts with a concrete tool for evaluating whether a school has 
provided a student with a FAPE.171 Third, the struggle between parents 
and special education providers would be reduced if not eliminated be-
cause both groups would be seeking the same goal: getting the student to 
perform well on the tests. 
Nevertheless, parents and special educators alike are hesitant to use 
standards-based testing as a tool for measuring whether the student is 
making educational progress because of the perception that test results do 
not equate to substantive learning, particularly for students with disabili-
ties.172 More importantly, the numerous difficulties of assessing the abili-
ties of students with disabilities via standardized tests are well docu-
mented.173 Additionally, focusing solely on test results could produce 
jurisprudence not substantively different from the Rowley standard. Giv-
en such a concrete measuring tool, courts might take a minimalistic ap-
proach to IEP evaluation similar to Rowley’s focus on passing courses 
and advancing to the next grade each year.174 
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It is apparent any new standard must be more definite than the cur-
rent standards, which are based on loosely defined terms like some and 
meaningful, but not so defined as to be limited strictly to test results.  
D. Reasonable Progress Standard 
One of the Court’s concerns in Rowley involved the large burden 
that would be placed on schools if they were required to maximize a stu-
dent’s potential when developing an IEP.175 The facts of the Rowley case 
were such that the Court could brush off consideration of a child’s poten-
tial as unnecessary. Amy Rowley, the child whose education was at 
question in Rowley, performed better than many of her peers did.176 De-
spite the fact that the Court asserted it decided the case only on the facts 
before it and did not seek to set a singular standard for IEP evaluation,177 
Rowley did set a standard that has since allowed schools to discount the 
potential of thousands of children with disabilities.  
In the wake of this, many scholars have argued an appropriate 
standard should be based on the child’s potential and the ways in which 
the child is capable of learning.178 Failing to consider a child’s potential 
seems counterintuitive to the idea of developing an individualized educa-
tion program.179 Although the individualized nature of special education 
suggests schools must consider potential, that alone is not enough. Like 
meaningfulness, potential is hard to measure. Thus, any new legal stand-
ard, which hopes for better results than the current standards, must in-
clude something measureable.  
An appropriate standard for evaluating whether a student has been 
provided with a FAPE should be results-based. Rather than relying on 
standardized test results, this Comment proposes a reasonable progress 
standard. This standard measures whether the student makes reasonable 
progress on annual goals. To develop these goals, the IEP team must 
analyze and discuss the student’s capacity and potential. Rather than 
focusing on maximizing potential, the reasonable progress standard fo-
cuses on tailoring IEP goals towards what the student is capable of 
achieving with the proper special education services. Appropriate tailor-
ing will of course require the IEP team to conduct appropriate evalua-
tions to determine the child’s capability.180 Additionally, this standard 
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would require schools to document the results rather than documenting 
goals only and allowing the IEP team to base progress towards those 
goals on conclusory assertions.181 
Courts commonly use the term reasonable in different areas of law, 
with each usage having a slightly different meaning. However, unlike 
some or meaningful, courts have found ways to put definite limits on 
what is and is not reasonable.182 Similarly, in the context of IDEA, clear 
boundaries exist to guide courts as to what constitutes reasonable pro-
gress. Specifically, under the standard this Comment proposes, a student 
would make reasonable progress when the student is on pace, based on 
the previous year’s progress, to meet the state’s grade-level standards for 
the next level of education. Thus, throughout elementary school, the 
gauge would be the state standards for the first level of middle school. 
Similarly, while the student is in middle school, the grade-level standards 
for high school would determine whether the student was making rea-
sonable progress. However, to prepare high school students with disabili-
ties for post-secondary life adequately, the measure of reasonable would 
have to be more complex. 
Unlike elementary and middle school, where the next step is gener-
ally the same for almost all students, what comes after high school is 
uncertain, variable, and dependent on a number of extraneous factors. 
The possibility of more than one post-secondary path necessarily creates 
an additional step in the process. That is, schools must undertake to eval-
uate the student’s progress through middle school to determine which 
path seems most appropriate.183 Three possible paths include preparation 
for college, preparation for technical or vocational school, or preparation 
for the workforce.184 
At least at the high school level, this model of IEP development 
would not be substantially different from what is currently required un-
der the IDEA. Once a student with a disability reaches the age of sixteen, 
the IEP must include transition services.185 As a coordinated set of activi-
ties for a student with a disability, transition services are designed to be 
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results oriented and focused on improving academic and functional 
achievement of the student to facilitate movement from high school to 
post-secondary activities.186 These services include preparation for col-
lege, vocational school, or appropriate employment and living inde-
pendently as an adult.187 The student’s individual needs must form the 
basis of the transition services.188 Further, the services must take the stu-
dent’s strengths, preferences, and interests into consideration.189 Thus, 
the IDEA requires that schools actually consider a student’s potential 
once they reach a certain age. The standard this Comment proposes 
simply extends this requirement to all ages while the child is in public 
school. 
Under this legal standard, a school provides a FAPE to a student 
with a disability when that student makes reasonable progress toward his 
or her annual goals. If at any level of schooling the student is not able to 
make reasonable progress utilizing the services the school is capable of 
providing, the school has failed to provide the student with a FAPE. As 
allowed under the IDEA, the student’s parents could then elect to transfer 
the child to a specialized school that is capable of providing services that 
will not amount to the denial of a FAPE.190 Most importantly, because 
the public school will have failed to provide the student with a FAPE, the 
parents can more often successfully request reimbursement from the pub-
lic school district for the cost of the specialized school’s tuition, provided 
the evidence shows the student is making reasonable progress at the spe-
cialized school.191 
E. Benefits of Reasonable Progress Standard 
The Rowley Court decided on the some educational benefit standard 
because that standard best served Congressional intent as evidenced by 
the language and legislative history of the EHA.192 The IDEA amend-
ments as well as NCLB clearly show Congressional intent has 
changed.193 Congress is no longer only concerned with providing stu-
dents with disabilities access to education.194 The goals of special educa-
tion have expanded to providing students with disabilities an education 
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that will prepare them for life after school.195 The reasonable progress 
standard serves this goal. The focus of this standard is always on the stu-
dent’s future. When educators aim towards preparing the student for the 
next level of education, they will be less likely to set goals for the student 
that are based on the low standard of only giving the student some bene-
fit. Further, the reasonable progress standard honors Congressional intent 
to better prepare students with disabilities for some degree of independ-
ent living rather than dependence on the community.196 
In addition to honoring Congressional intent, the reasonable pro-
gress standard addresses the Supreme Court’s concern that, were it to 
espouse a standard requiring schools to consider students’ potential, 
schools would be overburdened in the pursuit of maximizing the poten-
tial of each child that has a disability.197 The reasonable progress stand-
ard does not require schools to maximize students’ potential. Instead, it 
simply brings the requirements schools must meet up to the same level as 
general education students. When an IEP is based on results, such as 
reasonable progress, it becomes a comprehensive plan as to how to help 
the student reach the standards the state applies to the nondisabled stu-
dents in public schools.198  
Finally, by shifting to the reasonable progress standard, courts could 
help reduce the amount of public resources devoted to caring for adults 
with disabilities who never received an education that would adequately 
prepare them for adulthood. Adoption of this standard will require ele-
mentary and middle schools to make substantial changes to IEP devel-
opment as well as the provision of services to students with disabilities to 
ensure each student receives a FAPE, resulting in increased expenses for 
public schools.199 Nevertheless, the reduced public expenditures formerly 
dedicated to caring for adults with disabilities who are unable to provide 
for themselves will offset these increased costs.200 Given a proper educa-
tion, children with disabilities are more likely to grow into adults that 
possess the skills that will give them the chance at independent living, 
including self-care and higher education or vocational training.201  
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F. Endrew Could Have Been the Opportunity to Set a New Standard 
Aside from being an excellent example of why the Rowley standard 
must be set aside, other aspects of Endrew gave rise to an opportunity for 
the Tenth Circuit to lay the foundation for a new legal standard to evalu-
ate IEP adequacy. First, Endrew relied heavily on the precedent set in 
Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P ex rel. Jeff P., the reasoning of 
which is in conflict with current Congressional intent.202 Second, in En-
drew, the lack of progress monitoring provided an opening to require a 
results-based standard like the reasonable progress standard.203  
Endrew follows Tenth Circuit precedent that conflicts with national 
education policy created through the IDEA and NCLB. Endrew relied in 
part on Thompson, which reasoned that “Congress did not provide . . . a 
guarantee of self-sufficiency for all [persons with disabilities], and the 
most authoritative arbiter of congressional intent has already reached this 
conclusion [in Rowley].”204 The Thompson court further reasoned that 
although the ability to generalize skills is crucial to self-sufficiency, the 
IDEA did not make self-sufficiency the standard.205 However, the IDEA 
now requires schools to implement transition services that prepare the 
student for post-secondary life.206 The transition services requirement is 
directly in line with one of the IDEA’s stated purposes: to prepare chil-
dren with disabilities for independent adult life.207 This requirement, 
along with the fact that Rowley interpreted legislation Congress has sub-
stantially updated, suggests that Thompson conflicts with Congressional 
intent, making it less than authoritative precedent. 
As for the child in Thompson, if he never acquires the ability to 
generalize his educational skills outside of the classroom, the transition 
services his high school must provide will be difficult, if not impossible, 
to accomplish. Although Thompson finds support in the intent of the 
EHA, it now fails to keep up with the capabilities of individual with dis-
abilities as well as special educational goals and policy. Even accepting 
as true that the panel that decided Endrew lacked the authority to subvert 
established precedent, the panel could have acknowledged the reasoning 
that supported Rowley and Thompson is no longer true. 
Although the panel failed to recognize that the present national spe-
cial education policy is not the same as it was when Rowley was decided, 
it did acknowledge “Drew’s IEPs contain[ed] little or no progress report-
ing or measurement data and where progress was reported, it was ‘lack-
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ing in detail’ or limited to ‘conclusory statements.’”208 However, Drew’s 
parents classified the progress monitoring differently, asserting the 
school never reported the results of Drew’s progress.209 Despite ac-
knowledging the lack in progress monitoring, the Endrew court reasoned 
that because the goals listed on each year’s IEP increased in difficulty, 
the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide Drew with some education-
al benefit.210 However, other courts have found when the student has 
ASD, as Drew does, without “meaningful, measureable goals and objec-
tives, there can be no ‘appropriate and meaningful education and devel-
opmental interventions . . . .’”211 Therefore, in the absence of evidence in 
the form of documented, measurable results that Drew met the goals of 
lesser difficulty before the school increased the difficulty of those goals, 
the reasoning in Endrew lies in an unfounded assumption based on 
meaningless, generalized opinions of progress.212 Requiring results, as 
would be necessary under the reasonable progress standard, would pro-
vide a foundation on which a court could rest its assertion that schools 
are providing children with disabilities a FAPE.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our judicial system should strive to put into action the values Con-
gress stated in 1974: that education of United States citizens is of prima-
ry importance and that one’s resources should not limit one’s educational 
opportunities.213 This goal cannot be realized as long as courts continue 
to adhere to the Rowley standard. Rowley sets expectations for students 
with disabilities too low, pitting parents, special educators, and school 
administrators against one another.214 Further, it encourages courts to be 
narrowly focused and minimalistic in their approach to IEP and FAPE 
evaluation.215  
Most significantly, Rowley couched its reasoning in honoring Con-
gressional intent.216 Both the amendments to the EHA, now known as the 
IDEA, and the enactment of NCLB demonstrate Congress intends to 
provide students with disabilities with more than mere access to public 
education.217 Congress now seeks to raise the expectations schools have 
of students with disabilities and adequately prepare them for adulthood 
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and independent living.218 Applying Rowley only frustrates these pur-
suits, requiring development of a new legal standard. 
The reasonable progress standard would support not only national 
education values but also the purposes of the IDEA by focusing on the 
student’s future and requiring reporting of progress results. In addition to 
supporting Congressional intent, implementation of the reasonable pro-
gress standard could reduce public expenditures that fund the care and 
support of adults with disabilities.  
Endrew failed to consider any of the deficiencies Rowley presents, 
or that it is time to develop a new standard. The Tenth Circuit ignored 
the fact that the Douglas County could not have known whether Drew 
was making progress, as the school had not recorded any of the supposed 
progress in his IEPs.219 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit unquestioningly 
followed precedent that conflicts with Congressional intent.220 The val-
ues behind providing public education mandate more than blind obedi-
ence to precedent and refusal to see the real-life consequences of not 
demanding to know public schools are providing an appropriate educa-
tion to students with disabilities. Congress has taken action to effect 
those values; it is time the courts follow suit by disavowing Rowley and 
developing a new legal standard to determine whether a child with a dis-
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